

October 26, 1962

I

1. First Week: We consult with Italian, Turkish and Greek Embassies here in support of Finletter consultation with Pomareps in Paris about the multilateral Southern Command pilot sea-based NCSH force suggested in his POLTO 506. (Draft telegram attached.) In light of discussions with Ambassadors, a special emissary might be sent to Rome and Turkey.

2. Current. At same time:

(a) US starts to work out timing and forum for bilateral US-Soviet negotiations with USSR, via U Thant. US makes clear that, if these negotiations do not result in early removal Soviet offensive weapons in Cuba, it will take necessary military action.

(b) US encourages interested countries in UN to plow ahead with concept of Latin American and African nuclear-free zones.

II

3. Second Week. If consultation with Italians and Turks warrants, us:

(a) Suggest to Italian Government, via its Embassy here and its Pomarep in Paris, that it respond to US October 22 presentation on multilateral force by proposing early formation of pilot multilateral sea-based force in Southern Command, with participation

participation by Turks, Greeks, Italians and two non-European members: US and Canada.

(b) Suggest to Greek, Turkish, and Canadian governments (via Embassies here and Perhaps in Paris) that they be prepared to respond affirmatively.

(c) Suggest to Turkish and Italian governments that this will make it possible for them to get on record that we take to be their intent anyway, i.e., that they are prepared to phase out IREH's, in view of the prospective formation of a southern force and the interim coverage provided by US Polaris and other external forces in the meantime, without this move seeming a response to Soviet pressure.

Assuming a favorable response to these suggestions, the play promptly unfolds in the MAC, and the US responds by indicating that it is prepared to join in southern multilateral pilot force, if countries concerned wish to proceed, and will provide coverage with Polaris and other external forces in meantime. Italian and Turkish Perhaps make known in course of discussion their intent to phase out IREH's, since they could not afford both Southern Force and IREH's, but these statements are not made public at the time. (There has never yet been an MAC leak.)

4. Current. At same time, US-Soviet negotiations begin:

(a) On Cuba, we propose removal of Soviet offensive weapons, in return for end of US quarantine. This could be done in context of Latin American nuclear free zone, and proposals for such a zone should represent the main initiative in looking to a solution of the crisis.

(b) On arms control, we propose US-Soviet non-diffusion declarations, safeguards against miscalculation (e.g., communication facilities between US and Soviet command centers), and US-Soviet declarations not to facilitate procurement of MRBM's for national land deployment in NATO and Warsaw Pact countries other than US and USSR (based on stated US policy only to facilitate MRBM procurement for multilateral sea-based force). If Soviets raise question of Italian and Turkish IRBM's, we could decide at that time, in consultation with our allies, whether to make public the prior Italian and Turkish IRBM statements; if so, the US could formally declare its desire to respect these governments' stated intentions to phase out IRBM's, as part of the general declarations on MRBM's referred to above.

NOTE: The timing of all these moves would, of course, be substantially affected by concurrent Soviet diplomatic and other actions.

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